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Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants a
federal clemency power to the president. Similarly, each state vests a
clemency power in one of its branches of government for cases arising
under state law.1 Every state has its own rules and procedures governing
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clemency2 hearings and the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the discretionary nature of clemency proceedings means that state
clemency hearings are “beyond judicial review.”3 They are granted as a
matter of grace rather than right, and are not subject to constitutional
requirements such as due process or the effective assistance of counsel.4
State clemency proceedings, though discretionary, are nevertheless
formal hearings in which a petitioner might require representation in
order to ensure meaningful review of his case.5 In 1988, Congress
addressed this concern when it passed § 848 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
which, on its face, arguably guarantees federally-funded counsel to
indigent capital defendants in state clemency proceedings.6
A circuit split has developed, however, as to whether the Act
should be interpreted to provide such federally-funded representation.
Notwithstanding the statutory language, some circuit courts continue to
prohibit federally-funded counsel to indigent state clemency petitioners
in capital cases. Although the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the split,
the issue continues to gain steam in circuit courts. Most recently, the
Tenth Circuit sitting en banc reversed its original position and
determined that the statutory language indeed does, under certain
circumstances, require federally-funded counsel for indigent state
2

Some confusion exists regarding the precise definition of relevant vocabulary
terms such as “executive clemency,” “pardon,” “amnesty,” “commutation,” and
“reprieve.” For purposes of this article, “executive clemency” is the comprehensive
general term, encompassing the others.
3
Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court’s Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 337
(1996). See also Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (observing
that clemency decisions “have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they
are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review”); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979) (holding that the executive branch
conducts clemency hearings, free from appeal and collateral relief proceedings).
4
See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). The modern
Court’s understanding of the clemency power is a reflection of Chief Justice John
Marshall’s view of clemency. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)
(holding that executive clemency power is unlimited, with impeachment serving as its
sole check); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (holding that the
federal clemency power is bound to the duties of the executive branch and is free from
judicial review as well as the strict, inflexible procedural rules that govern the judicial
process).
5
See Palacios, supra note 3, at 345-46 (noting that the formality of some states’
clemency procedures makes counsel necessary); Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There Is
Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear
to Death Row Inmates’ Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 398 (1995) (arguing that the
assistance of competent counsel is required for a meaningful clemency hearing).
6
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(b), 102 Stat. 4181,
4393-94 (1989) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)).
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clemency petitioners.7 This article examines the reasons behind some
courts’ decisions to stray from the statutory plain language and proposes
a solution that adequately deals with the concerns of the courts without
violating the language of the statute.
I present a brief background of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 in
Part I, as well as the relevant statutory language dealing with federallyfunded counsel for indigent state clemency petitioners. In Part II, I
examine the existing circuit split. I first present the two original
diverging cases, In re Lindsey8 and Hill v. Lockhart,9 and then trace the
trend of recent court decisions that have generally favored Lindsey’s
reasoning, thus denying federally-funded counsel for indigent state
clemency petitioners in capital cases.
In Part III, I show that the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Lindsey
was flawed because its concerns are potentially applicable to judicial
proceedings, but not to clemency proceedings. Next, I argue that the
Lindsey line of cases would be more convincing had the courts based
their denial of federally-funded representation at state clemency
proceedings on federalism concerns rather than on an assertion of the
ambiguity of the statutory language.
Finally, in Part IV, I propose a solution that resolves the circuit split
in a way that adequately addresses federalism concerns without violating
the plain language of the statute.
I. THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988
Although the Constitution requires states to provide representation
for indigent defendants at trial and on direct appeal, the Supreme Court
has held that the constitutional mandate does not extend to postconviction judicial proceedings.10 The Court has also held, however, that
state statutory grants of post-conviction representation for indigent state
petitioners are constitutionally acceptable.11 Like petitioners in state
7

See Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Hain v. Mullin II”).
875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989).
9
992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993).
10
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the constitutional
right to counsel applies not only to trial, but also to the direct appeal of a conviction);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that states are not constitutionally required
to provide counsel for indigent defendants on discretionary appeals); Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in
post-conviction proceedings, and thus there is no constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in those hearings either); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (holding that the Finley doctrine applies to capital
cases).
11
See, e.g., Finley, 481 U.S. at 559 (holding that states have discretionary power to
establish post-conviction counsel programs).
8
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collateral judicial proceedings,12 state clemency petitioners are not
constitutionally entitled to representation.13 By passing the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, however, Congress arguably granted counsel to state
indigent capital petitioners seeking clemency, as long as the petitioner
first seeks federal habeas relief.14
A. Overview
Just days before the federal election of 1988, Congress spent the
last moments of the congressional term finalizing the provisions of a new
anti-drug act.15 The act combined two of the hottest political issues of the
day, the “War on Drugs” and the death penalty, and was passed by
Congress on October 21-22, 1988.16 President Reagan signed the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 into law on November 18.17
The statute provides that under certain circumstances the death
penalty applies to criminals acting as a part of drug-related criminal
enterprises. According to the statute, a criminal enterprise exists when
(1) a person violates a felony drug law provision, and (2) such violation
“is part of a continuing series of violations of the federal drug laws
undertaken by the person in concert with five or more other persons
regarding whom the person serves as organizer, supervisor or manager
and from which that individual derives substantial income or
resources.”18 The death penalty is an acceptable punishment when a
person, acting as a part of a criminal enterprise, “intentionally kills or
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing
of an individual”19 or law enforcement officer.20
In addition to making capital punishment a viable option for new
cases, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also established procedural
safeguards designed to prevent the unwarranted infliction of the death
penalty. Some of these safeguards include a bifurcated guilt/sentencing
proceeding,21 the need for the government to prove at least two statutory

12

For purposes of this article, the terms “post-conviction proceeding (hearing)” and
“collateral proceeding (hearing)” are synonymous.
13
See supra note 4.
14
See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) (2000).
15
See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs and Death: Congress Authorizes the Death
Penalty for Certain Drug-Related Murders, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 47, 51-53 (1992).
16
Id. at 53.
17
Id.
18
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)).
19
21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A).
20
21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B).
21
21 U.S.C. § 848(i).
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aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt,22 and a prohibition
against imposing the death sentence on defendants who were less than 18
years old at the time the crime was committed, or who are mentally
retarded or significantly mentally disabled.23
B. Counsel for Indigent Capital Defendants
Perhaps the most notorious statutory safeguard of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, however, is its grant of counsel to indigent capital
defendants. Not only does the statute explicitly require counsel where the
Supreme Court has held counsel to be constitutionally compelled (i.e., at
trial and on direct appeal),24 but it also seems to require indigent capital
defendants to be represented during state post-conviction judicial
proceedings as well as state clemency hearings.25
Two specific provisions of the Act particularly strengthen the right
to counsel for capital defendants. The first “made the appointment of
counsel mandatory for indigent capital defendants pursuing federal
habeas relief.”26 It states in pertinent part:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of
title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to
obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other
reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment
of one or more attorneys . . . .27

Section 2254 of title 28 refers to petitioners who have been sentenced to
death for state crimes and seek federal habeas corpus relief.28 Section
2255 refers to those seeking similar relief from federal death sentences.29
In order to qualify under section 2254, a petitioner must show that he has
“exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an
absence of available State corrective process; or circumstances exist that
render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”30
22

21 U.S.C. § 848(j).
21 U.S.C. § 848(l).
24
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A).
25
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8). For Supreme Court precedent denying constitutional
protections such as the right to counsel for petitioners in post-conviction proceedings, see
supra note 4.
26
Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital
Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital
Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 46 (2003).
27
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).
28
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
29
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
30
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). No such exhaustion requirement exists for § 2255 petitioners.
23
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Having satisfied the state exhaustion requirements, an indigent capital
petitioner is thus entitled under the statute to federally-appointed counsel
during the habeas hearing.31 This provision is constitutionally
uncontroversial because it purports to use federal funds32 to pay counsel
representing indigent petitioners in federal habeas proceedings.
The controversy surrounds the second relevant statutory provision,
in which the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 seems to extend the right of
counsel for indigent capital petitioners past the federal habeas hearing. It
appears to require federal funding for counsel representing indigent
defendants in various subsequent state proceedings, including petitions
for state clemency. The relevant provision states:
Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the
attorney’s own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each
attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant throughout
every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,
including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new
trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction
process, together with applications for stays of execution and
other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also
represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and
proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available
to the defendant.33

While the plain language of the statute seems straightforward, courts are
nevertheless divided as to whether this provision requires federallyfunded counsel to represent indigent state clemency petitioners. Before
presenting my proposed interpretation of the statute, it is first necessary
to explore the arguments presented by the diverging judicial opinions,
31

For analysis of the state exhaustion requirement as a prerequisite for federal habeas
relief, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (holding that (1) a federal habeas hearing
can only proceed if all claims have been exhausted at the state level and (2) a federal
habeas application with some exhausted claims and some unexhausted claims must be
entirely denied). See also Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that the state
exhaustion requirement for federal habeas proceedings minimizes friction between state
and federal judicial systems because the state has the first opportunity to correct its own
violations of federal rights); Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
(noting that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to prevent federal disruption of state
court proceedings and protect the role of state courts in upholding federal law); Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (noting that “the public good requires that [the
relationship between state courts and federal courts] be not disturbed by unnecessary
conflict”).
32
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) establishes the rate at which federal funds will be used to
compensate attorneys representing indigent defendants under the statute.
33
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) (emphasis added).
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especially the reasoning that has led some circuits to declare that §
848(q) does not allow indigent state clemency petitioners to receive
federally-funded representation, even though the plain language of the
statute seems to indicate otherwise.
II. EVALUATION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Four circuits have heard cases involving federal compensation for
counsel in state clemency proceedings under § 848(q)(8).34 Three of
those circuits originally held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 does
not allow federal funding for the representation of indigent petitioners in
state executive clemency hearings, but the Tenth Circuit has recently
reversed its position.35 Currently, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits interpret
the statute as providing federally-funded counsel at state clemency
proceedings at least under some circumstances.36 However, the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that the only plausible interpretation of the statute
is to deny such representation at state clemency hearings.37 In doing so,
the Fifth Circuit adopted and extended the holding in In re Lindsey,38 a
1989 Eleventh Circuit case that did not directly involve a dispute over
state clemency proceedings.
A. The Reasoning of In re Lindsey
Petitioner Lindsey, a death row prisoner in Alabama, sought federal
court-appointed counsel under § 848(q) for state judicial proceedings
following his federal habeas hearing.39 Lindsey filed a federal habeas
corpus petition without first having exhausted his claims in state court.
After his federal habeas hearing, Lindsey requested that the federal
district court appoint counsel to represent him under the provision of §
848(q)(8), which states that indigent capital petitioners are entitled to
federally funded counsel in all “subsequent stage[s] of available judicial
proceedings”40 following federal habeas petitions entered under 28
34

See Hain v. Mullin II, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006); King v. Moore, 31 F.3d
1365 (11th Cir. 2002); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Lockhart,
992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993).
The Sixth Circuit has held that the language of § 848(q)(8) does not allow
federally-funded counsel in state judicial proceedings, but has not specifically extended
that holding to state clemency petitioners. See House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997 (6th Cir.
2003).
35
See Hain v. Mullin II, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006).
36
Id.; Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993).
37
Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2002).
38
875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989).
39
Id.
40
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8).

372

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:365

U.S.C. § 2254.41 The Eleventh Circuit denied Lindsey’s claim, holding
that the phrases “subsequent stage of judicial proceedings” as well as
“proceedings for executive or other clemency” from § 848(q)(8) cannot
apply to state proceedings.42 The court based its denial of Lindsey’s
claims on three arguments: (1) following Lindsey’s interpretation would
supplant state systems for appointing counsel, (2) granting Lindsey’s
petition would disrupt proper judicial sequence developed from
federalism concerns, and (3) if Congress had intended such a novel result
as sought by Lindsey, it would have used “unmistakable terms” to state
as much.43
Lindsey held that allowing the above mentioned statutory language
to apply on both the state and federal levels would, first, “have the
practical effect of supplanting state-court systems for the appointment of
counsel in collateral review cases.”44 The court’s concern was that
indigent state capital defendants would be able to petition for federal
habeas review and immediately receive federally-funded counsel.
Defendants such as Lindsey would then take advantage of that
representation at the state level, rendering futile any state mechanism for
appointing counsel to indigent defendants because a petitioner could
receive a federally-appointed attorney for state as well as federal judicial
proceedings.45
The court’s second concern was that Lindsey’s interpretation of the
statute would encourage indigent capital defendants to ignore the proper
sequence for seeking post conviction relief by immediately filing futile
federal habeas petitions just to secure federally appointed counsel for
future state judicial proceedings, thus violating fundamental principles of
federalism.46 The court feared that capital state defendants would bypass
state collateral review and immediately file a futile petition for federal
habeas relief just to secure federally-appointed counsel. Armed with
federal representation, the defendant would then return to state collateral
proceedings. Such a process would disrupt the established sequence of
exhausting state avenues for relief prior to seeking federal relief and thus
raise federalism concerns because defendants could seek federal habeas
relief for a violation on the state level before the state judicial system had
an adequate opportunity to resolve the error itself.47 Principles of
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Lindsey, 875 F.2d at 1505-06.
Id. at 1506-07.
Id.
Id. at 1506.
See id.
Id. at 1506-07.
Id.
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federalism dictate that no federal relief be sought until all available
avenues of state relief have been completely exhausted.48
Third, the court held that if Congress had intended to introduce the
substantial change in accepted judicial practice argued by Lindsey, “it
would have stated so in unmistakable terms.”49 Notwithstanding its first
two concerns, the court noted that Congress could potentially fund
counsel to assist capital state prisoners in state collateral hearings, but the
language of § 848(q) does not unambiguously evince such congressional
intent.50 The court would have been convinced if the statute explicitly
stated that federally-funded counsel would be provided for “all inmates
seeking collateral review of death sentences, regardless of whether such
review was sought in state or federal court.”51 Because § 848 lacks such
language, however, the court refused to interpret the statute to cause such
drastic change in the judicial process.52
The three arguments put forward by the Eleventh Circuit in In re
Lindsey made no distinction between “judicial proceedings” and
“proceedings for executive clemency.” Its holding regarding the
clemency language, however, is dicta since the facts of the case did not
involve clemency proceedings. Nevertheless, the Lindsey court applied
its analysis to the issues involving federal representation of indigent state
clemency petitioners as well as those involving federal representation in
state judicial proceedings. Therefore, although the facts did not require it,
the Eleventh Circuit was the first to evaluate § 848(q)’s clemency
language and it ultimately concluded that the statute does not provide
federally-funded counsel for indigent petitioners in state executive
clemency proceedings.
B. An Alternative to Lindsey: Hill v. Lockhart
Four years later, in the second major case involving federallyfunded representation for indigent state clemency petitioners under §
848(q), the Eighth Circuit in Hill v. Lockhart heard a case that directly
involved the clemency language. Unlike the Lindsey court, however, the
Eighth Circuit differentiated between “judicial proceedings” and
“clemency proceedings.”53 It agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s three
reasons for denying federal funding for representation in state judicial
proceedings, but noted that “the issue is far less clear, however, in cases
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1507.
Id. at 1508-09.
Id. at 1507.
Id. at 1509.
Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993).
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involving state . . . clemency proceedings, which frequently are not
commenced until state and federal postconviction relief have been
denied and an execution date has been set.”54 The Hill court noted that
the plain language of § 848(q) was evidence of congressional intent to
ensure compensated counsel at clemency proceedings.55 However, the
Hill court also noted that “Congress did not intend to encourage futile
federal habeas petitions filed only to obtain attorney compensation for
state proceedings.”56
The Eighth Circuit attempted to strike a balance between the plain
statutory language and the threat of frivolous federal habeas petitions by
holding that the language of § 848(q) regarding clemency proceedings
should be understood to provide federally-funded representation for
indigent state petitioners when (1) the request comes as part of a nonfrivolous federal habeas petition, (2) state law does not provide for
representation in clemency proceedings, and (3) the attorney requests
compensation for state proceedings before performing the services.57
Thus, in contrast with the Lindsey court, the Eighth Circuit held that §
848(q) requires federally-funded representation for indigent state
clemency petitioners at least under some circumstances.
C. Lindsey’s Recent Influence
The Fifth and the Tenth Circuits both originally rejected the Hill
understanding of § 848(q) in favor of the Lindsey court’s interpretation,
but the Tenth Circuit ultimately reversed its position and adopted a plain
language reading of the statutory language. In Sterling v. Scott, the Fifth
Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in the Lindsey decision
with respect to state post-conviction judicial proceedings, but explicitly
made no holding regarding the clemency issue, as that issue was not
before the court.58 In 2002, however, the Fifth Circuit heard a case that
dealt directly with the clemency language of § 848(q).
In Clark v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit held that the three-part
Lindsey analysis, which the Sterling court followed, should apply to
representation in clemency proceedings in the same way that it applies to
state post-conviction judicial proceedings.59 The Fifth Circuit’s holding
in Johnson played two major roles in the development of clemency
54

Id. at 803.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
26 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 996 (1994).
59
278 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying federal compensation to counsel for
representation provided during state clemency proceedings).
55

2006]

Clarifying the Confusion of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)

375

jurisprudence under § 848(q). First, it adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s
dicta analysis as the basis for deciding that § 848(q) does not provide
federal funding for indigent state clemency petitioners.60 Second, by
adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, the Fifth Circuit refused to
accept the Eighth Circuit’s theory that § 848(q) allows federal funding
for representation in state clemency hearings under certain
circumstances.61
Following the Fifth Circuit’s lead, the Eleventh Circuit officially
extended its own Lindsey analysis by specifically holding that § 848(q)
does not provide federal funding for representation in state clemency
proceedings.62 The court held in King v. Moore that the same three
considerations announced in Lindsey for denying federally-funded
counsel in state post-conviction judicial proceedings also apply to
denying such funding in state clemency hearings.63 In addition, the King
court noted that “nothing in the legislative history indicates to us that
Congress decided to pay . . . lawyers to represent defendants in state
proceedings.”64 Given the absence of “unmistakable terms” to the
contrary (as noted in Lindsey), the court held that the last-minute nature
of the addition of the relevant language and the lack of floor debate on
the amendment must result in the denial of federally-funded counsel in
state clemency hearings.65
In 2003, the Tenth Circuit joined the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits by
applying the Lindsey reasoning to cases involving federal compensation
for counsel in state clemency proceedings.66 In Hain v. Mullin I, the court
rejected Hill in favor of the Lindsey/King line of reasoning because it
worried that “every state capital defendant unsuccessful in seeking
federal habeas relief would be entitled to federally appointed and funded
counsel to represent them in state clemency proceedings.”67 On January
23, 2006, however, the Tenth Circuit reconsidered its position. In Hain v.
Mullin II,68 the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc rejected the Lindsey/King
60

Id. at 463 (“‘proceeding for executive or other clemency as may be available to the
defendants’ as it appears in § 848(q)(8) does not apply to state clemency proceedings”).
61
Id.
62
See King v. Moore, 31 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002).
63
Id. at 1368 (holding that “federal” is an implied modifier for every use of
“proceedings” in § 848(q)).
64
Id. at 1367.
65
Id.
66
Hain v. Mullin, 324 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Hain v. Mullin I”)
(holding that an interpretation of the clemency provision of § 848(q) that allows federal
funding for state clemency representation “defies common sense and would produce
absurd results”), vacated, 327 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2003).
67
Id. at 1150.
68
436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006).
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analysis. The Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach the
Lindsey/King concerns because “Section 848(q) employs clear and
precise language, admitting of no ambiguity and leaving no room for
interpretation.”69 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 848(q)
requires federally-appointed counsel for indigent state clemency
petitioners.70 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Hill, the Tenth Circuit did not
attempt to reconcile the plain statutory language with policy
considerations such as federalism concerns, which the dissent
specifically cited as a flaw in the majority’s approach.71 Instead, Hain v.
Mullin II states that the inquiry begins and ends with the plain statutory
language.72
Currently, then, two circuits (the Fifth and Eleventh) have held that
§ 848(q)’s clemency provision does not entitle indigent state capital
petitioners to federally-funded counsel in clemency proceedings. The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have both held that the language of § 848(q)
allows such compensation, at least in some cases. Interestingly, the
position of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits is founded upon the three
principal concerns expressed by the Lindsey court in a decision that only
indirectly dealt with § 848(q)(8)’s clemency language. While this
reasoning is potentially convincing as applied to state post-conviction
judicial proceedings (the relevant issue in Lindsey), the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have erred in extending the same analysis to state
clemency proceedings.
III. ERROR OF RELYING ON THE REASONING IN LINDSEY
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have erred in relying on the
reasoning in Lindsey as the basis for denying federal funding to indigent
state clemency petitioners. The three-part Lindsey analysis was
potentially relevant to the issue before that court, which was whether §
848(q) requires federally-funded counsel in state post conviction
“judicial proceedings.” It is not applicable, however, to an analysis of
whether the statutory language requires federally-funded counsel in
69

Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1175.
71
Id. at 1178-79 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, if [we accept the majority’s
analysis], we would have the odd, and potentially unconstitutional, result of a federal
court (i.e., the federal district court that first appointed counsel pursuant to §
848(q)(4)(B)) effectively overseeing state proceedings.”).
72
Id. at 1172 (majority opinion) (“One need look no further than the statute’s plain
language to see that Congress has directed that counsel appointed to represent state death
row inmates during § 2254 proceedings must represent the defendant throughout every
subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings including proceedings for executive or
other clemency as may be available to the defendant.”) (internal quotations omitted).
70

2006]

Clarifying the Confusion of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)

377

“proceedings for executive clemency.” By failing to analytically
differentiate between the two, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have based
their denial of federal funds to compensate counsel representing indigent
state clemency petitioners on flawed analysis.73 Although the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits strayed from the plain statutory language, however,
their holdings are not necessarily incorrect. Flawed reasoning does not
necessarily lead to a mistaken outcome. The argument that indigent state
clemency petitioners are not entitled to federally-funded counsel would
have been more convincing had it been strictly founded on specific
federalism concerns relating to clemency proceedings rather than the
concerns enumerated in the Lindsey decision.
A. Three-Part Lindsey Reasoning Is Inapplicable to Clemency
Proceedings
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits based their holdings, which deny
federally-funded representation to indigent state clemency petitioners, on
the three concerns of the Lindsey court. As noted above, however, the
Lindsey decision dealt directly with federally-funded counsel at state
post-conviction judicial, rather than clemency, proceedings. The Lindsey
court’s concerns for (1) supplanting state mechanisms for appointing
counsel, (2) disrupting the proper sequence for seeking collateral review,
and (3) the lack of “unmistakable terms” in the statutory language, while
potentially applicable to the issue of federally-funded counsel in state
judicial proceedings, are inapplicable to current cases involving
clemency proceedings.
1. Supplanting State Systems for Appointing Counsel
Lindsey’s first reason for not interpreting § 848(q)(8) to provide
federal funds for state clemency representation is that such an
interpretation would supplant state systems for the appointment of
counsel.74 Despite the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ willingness to accept
this explanation as the basis for denying federal funds to state clemency
petitioners, it does not support the denial of such funds.
The provision providing federally-funded representation at state
clemency proceedings only applies if the capital petitioner is “unable to
obtain adequate representation.”75 If state systems, either through the
73

While the Eighth Circuit was on the right track when it acknowledged the
distinction between judicial proceedings and clemency proceedings, its solution, although
more convincing than the Lindsey analysis, is also unsatisfactory. See infra text
accompanying notes 121–124.
74
In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989).
75
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000).
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courts or otherwise, are already providing clemency representation to
indigent capital petitioners, adequate representation is available and §
848(q)(8) does not take effect. The promise of federally-funded
clemency counsel only applies to capital petitioners from states that do
not already provide adequate help, thus federally-funded clemency
counsel cannot directly supplant existing state mechanisms.76
Nevertheless, there exists a threat that states will discontinue their statefunded systems for providing clemency counsel because the federal
government will thus be forced to pay for the same services, and thus §
848 will indirectly supplant the state systems. States that allow counsel in
clemency proceedings might be less likely to provide state-funded
representation for indigent clemency petitioners because § 848(q) forces
the federal government to foot the bill for the same service following the
defendant’s habeas petition. However, in other cases involving similar
policy issues the Supreme Court has held that, under the Spending
Clause, Congress can condition the payment of federal funds on specific
statutory requirements.77 Thus, the threat that states will alter their
policies in order to receive federal funding has been considered
insufficient by itself to declare federal legislation unlawful.78 The risk
that federally-funded counsel will supplant state-funded representation
for indigent clemency petitioners is therefore insufficient, absent
additional constitutional conflicts, to reach a conclusion inconsistent with
the statute’s plain language.
2. Disrupting the Proper Sequence for Seeking Collateral Relief
Lindsey’s second reason for denying federal funding for
representation in state clemency hearings is that petitioners will ignore
proper judicial sequence and file futile federal habeas petitions just to
receive federal representation in subsequent proceedings.79 This concern
was valid with respect to judicial proceedings at the time of Lindsey
because petitioners could seek habeas relief in federal court before
exhausting their claims in state court, only to return to state court with
76

See Hain v. Mullin II, 436 F.3d 1168, 1173 n.6 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
“when a state refuses to pay for counsel at clemency proceedings, the defendant remains
unable to obtain adequate representation, and such representation is funded under the
statute”).
77
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the Spending
Clause allows Congress to condition federal funding on a state’s waiver of its
constitutional rights).
78
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Oklahoma v.
Civil Serv., 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
79
Lindsey, 875 F.2d at 1506-07.
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federally-funded counsel. Such an interpretation would give indigent
state capital defendants an incentive to bypass state collateral
proceedings and jump directly to federal habeas review, which would
violate the proper sequence, developed from concerns for federalism, of
seeking state relief before filing for federal review. However, such a
concern is inapplicable to current clemency proceedings for at least two
reasons.
First, clemency hearings fall outside the scope of both state and
federal judicial proceedings. The incentive to seek clemency relief is
unaltered by connecting clemency representation to federal habeas
representation. A capital defendant has two main avenues of potential
relief: the judicial process and the clemency process. The two operate
under different rules, are generally administered by different
governmental branches, and can be exhausted in any sequence. The
judicial process is more likely to bring relief than are clemency
proceedings,80 but capital defendants can file clemency petitions at any
time during the post-conviction judicial process. However, the
discretionary nature of clemency proceedings and the relative
unlikelihood of success are two factors that encourage defendants to seek
clemency only as a last resort.81 Thus, the provision of § 848(q)(8) that
compensates counsel with federal funds for representing indigent
defendants in state clemency hearings following a federal habeas petition
does not create an incentive to file habeas petitions before exhausting all
state claims. Federalism principles dictate that state judicial relief be
exhausted before relief is sought in federal court, but the parallel nature
of judicial and clemency proceedings make the sequence with which the
two are exhausted immaterial to ensuring a just outcome. Therefore, §
848(q)’s promise of federally-funded counsel at clemency hearings does
nothing to disrupt the incentives associated with seeking clemency after
exhausting all judicial avenues for relief.
Second, and more importantly, the Eleventh Circuit decided
Lindsey in 1989, seven years before Congress passed the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).82 As amended by the
80
See, e.g., Palacios, supra note 3, at 348 (noting that the recent decline in death
penalty commutations has led some to claim that “the clemency power is now defunct”).
81
See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998) (calling
clemency “a final and alternative avenue of relief”); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1,
at 838 (“After exhausting her state and federal avenues of relief, a capital defendant has
one last place she can turn for relief: executive clemency.”); Silverman, supra note 5, at
385 (“Most clemency applications are made after a condemned man has exhausted all his
appeals.”).
82
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title
I, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)).
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AEDPA, the habeas corpus statutes make it potentially fatal for a state
prisoner to file “shell” habeas petitions. A federal court can dismiss with
prejudice any habeas petition filed before the prisoner has exhausted his
state avenues of judicial relief.83 Additionally, the AEDPA states that the
one-year statute of limitations is not tolled if the petitioner prematurely
files for habeas relief.84 State capital prisoners will not risk forever
forfeiting their chance to seek meaningful habeas review of their case
merely to obtain federal counsel for potential clemency proceedings.
Therefore, the AEDPA has resolved the Lindsey court’s concern that
state prisoners will disrupt the proper sequence of post-conviction
review. State defendants now face a strict penalty for filing frivolous or
premature federal habeas petitions in an attempt to secure federallyfunded counsel in either subsequent state judicial or clemency
proceedings.
3. Lack of “Unmistakable Terms”
The final consideration expressed in Lindsey, which has led the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to deny federal funds as compensation for
representing indigent state clemency petitioners, was that if Congress
intended all indigent capital state clemency petitioners to receive federal
assistance, “it would have stated so in unmistakable terms.”85 In
conjunction with this argument, the Eleventh Circuit also noted that the
legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended to place such
a burden on the federal treasury by using federal funds to pay for state
clemency petitions.86 The court expected that such a novel interpretation
would be “too big and innovative” to have been passed at the end of a
congressional session and without any recorded debate.87 According to
the Lindsey court, these concerns lead to the conclusion that § 848(q)(8)
only ensures federally-funded counsel in post-conviction and clemency
proceedings for federal defendants. At least with respect to state
clemency proceedings, however, these concerns are unfounded. Two
principal features comprise the argument for the unambiguous nature of
the statutory text in § 848(q)(8), and thus the use of federal funds to
compensate counsel in state clemency hearings involving indigent
petitioners. These two factors establish that Congress did in fact employ
“unmistakable terms” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

83
84
85
86
87

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000).
In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987).
King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1368.
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First, the ordinary meaning of the statutory language dictates that
indigent state capital defendants should receive federally-funded counsel
in clemency proceedings. Because we must assume that Congress “says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,”88 a
correct understanding of the meaning and intent of any law must begin
with a correct understanding of the words employed by Congress. The
Supreme Court has held that courts must attempt to “give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word.”89 It is an accepted canon of statutory
interpretation that the terms used by Congress are given their ordinary
meaning.90
The pertinent language in § 848(q)(8) states that attorneys
appointed and compensated under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
“shall also represent the defendant in . . . proceedings for executive or
other clemency as may be available to the defendant.”91 The first step in
understanding whether Congress intended this language to provide
federal funding for state as well as federal clemency hearings is to
examine the ordinary meaning of the phrase “executive or other
clemency proceedings” as applied to capital defendants.
Ordinary use of the clause indicates that it explicitly applies to both
federal and state proceedings. Clemency is considered the final avenue of
relief for both capital federal defendants and capital state defendants.92
However, the federal clemency power lies exclusively within the federal
executive branch. The President of the United States is the only one that
can grant clemency to federal prisoners.93 The Constitution does not
require the states to enact clemency procedures of their own.
Nevertheless, the clemency power has existed in America since colonial
times.94 The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he original [s]tates were
reluctant to vest the clemency power in the executive.”95 Although the
state clemency power has “gravitated to the executive over time,”96
several states still vest the clemency power in the state legislative or

88

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citation omitted).
90
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
819-22 (West 3d ed. 2001) (noting that courts typically assume that legislatures employ
words in their ordinary sense).
91
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) (2000) (emphasis added).
92
See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 838.
93
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
94
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414 (1993).
95
Id. (citation omitted).
96
Id.
89
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judicial branches, rather than in the executive branch.97 Therefore, §
848(q)(8)’s language, which grants federally-funded counsel to
petitioners in “executive and other clemency proceedings,” must apply to
both federal and state petitioners. Otherwise, the phrase “other clemency
proceedings” would be meaningless as federal petitioners can only seek
clemency through executive proceedings. Only state petitioners could
seek clemency through “other proceedings,” such as those within the
power of the state legislative or judicial branches. The United States
Supreme Court has instructed that wherever possible, courts must give
effect to every word and clause of a statute.98 In this case, the plain
statutory language requires courts to hold that Congress intended
federally-funded counsel for indigent state and federal clemency
petitioners.
Even courts that have denied federal funding for indigent state
clemency petitioners concede that the ordinary meaning of the plain
language in § 848 (q)(8) refers to both state and federal clemency
proceedings.99 Therefore, given the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language providing that counsel appointed under the statute be
compensated for representing indigent petitioners100 in any available
“executive or other clemency proceedings,” Congress articulated in
“unmistakable terms” its intent to supply federally-funded attorneys in
both state and federal clemency hearings.101
Second, when read in light of § 848(q)(4)(B), it becomes
unequivocally clear that Congress intended § 848(q)(8) to use federal
funds to compensate counsel representing indigent petitioners in state
clemency proceedings. While the ordinary meaning of statutory language
is important to understanding congressional intent, that language’s
statutory context will inevitably bear on determining an accurate
97

See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004, 1006-07 (Conn. 1988) (“[i]n
Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature”); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8
(“the legislature may grant a pardon”); NEV. CONST. art. V, § 14 (“The governor, justices
of the supreme court, and attorney general [may] . . . commute punishments . . . and grant
pardons[] after convictions.”).
98
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
99
See, e.g., Hain v. Mullin I, 324 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying
federal funding for indigent state clemency petitioners, but noting that state clemency
proceedings just as easily fall within the statutory reference to “executive clemency” as
do federal clemency proceedings).
100
The terms “defendant” and “petitioner” as used in § 848(q) are synonymous for the
purposes of this analysis. See Strickler v. Greene, 57 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 n.5 (E.D. Va.
1999).
101
See, e.g., Gordon v. Vasquez, 859 F. Supp. 413, 418 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
the “plain meaning” of the statute requires federally-funded representation for indigent
state clemency petitioners).
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definition for the pertinent terms. Such is the case for the “executive
clemency proceedings” language in § 848(q)(8), which can only be
correctly understood in the context of § 848(q)(4)(B). This subsection
specifically states, in pertinent part, that federally-funded counsel will be
provided “in any post conviction proceeding brought under 28 U.S.C. §
2254.”102 Recall that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that capital defendants
convicted under state law can seek a remedy through federal habeas
corpus proceedings after exhausting all claims in state court. Thus,
federally-funded counsel is provided for indigent state prisoners who are
seeking federal relief through habeas corpus proceedings. Section
848(q)(8) requires that counsel continue to represent such state prisoners
beyond the habeas proceedings and into clemency hearings. For § 2254
habeas petitioners, clemency proceedings are only available through the
state because all § 2254 petitioners have committed state crimes.
Therefore, the plain language of § 848(q)(8) cannot be so limited as
to allow federally-funded representation at federal executive clemency
hearings only. An indigent state prisoner, having filed for habeas relief
according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, has only one option for clemency relief:
the state. The most plausible reading of the statutory language, then, is to
allow federal funding in state executive clemency hearings because
Congress explicitly required representation for indigent state prisoners
seeking clemency following their federal habeas hearing filed under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.103
The ordinary meaning of the terms used in § 848(q)(8) along with
the contextual understanding provided by § 848(q)(4)(B) unambiguously
lead to the conclusion that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 intended
federally-funded counsel to represent indigent petitioners in both federal
and state clemency hearings. Since the plain statutory language is
unambiguous, courts should allow federally-funded representation at
state clemency proceedings involving indigent petitioners according to §
848(q)(4)(B) and § 848(q)(8).104
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held, however, that the
statutory language is insufficient to grant federal counsel to indigent state
clemency petitioners. The Lindsey line of cases sought an understanding
of congressional intent in the statute’s legislative history and found no
evidence of intent to compensate state clemency attorneys with federal

102

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000).
See Hain, 324 F.3d at 1152-53; Strickler, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
104
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 20 (Princeton 1997)
(arguing that “Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for
the courts to decide which is which”).
103
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funds.105 The lack of legislative history only makes the language more
significant, however, since it is the sole source from which we can
establish congressional intent. By demanding more than the plain
statutory language in interpreting the act, the Lindsey court is faulting the
results produced by the law. Such concerns are not within the jurisdiction
of the courts, but are policy considerations that should be left to
Congress.106 Courts may only deviate from the plain statutory meaning
when it produces results so absurd “as to shock the general moral or
common sense.”107 Certainly, interpreting the plain statutory language of
§ 848(q) to allow federally-funded attorneys to represent indigent state
clemency petitioners is at least a reasonable interpretation, if not the only
plausible one.
Therefore, the Lindsey court’s concerns for (1) supplanting state
mechanisms for appointing counsel, (2) disrupting the proper sequence
for seeking collateral review, and (3) the lack of “unmistakable terms” in
the statutory language are inapplicable to clemency proceedings.
Although the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have relied on
unconvincing reasoning to deny federally-funded counsel to indigent
capital petitioners in state clemency hearings, their conclusion is not
necessarily unwarranted. Each court relied on Lindsey, which supplied
unsatisfactory analysis. Nevertheless, following the statutory plain
language would result in at least one major constitutional concern. State
clemency proceedings have long been immune from both judicial review
and federal involvement. States have wide-ranging discretion to dictate
their own clemency procedures and are not constitutionally required to
allow clemency petitioners the benefit of legal representation at those
hearings.108 Therefore, the plain language of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 potentially violates principles of federalism in so far as it forces
Congress to provide federally-funded counsel to all indigent state
clemency petitioners, even if the state does not allow counsel in its
clemency hearings. Although the courts do not explicitly rely on it, this
federalism concern is the strongest argument in favor of the conclusion
reached by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.

105
See King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
legislative history holds no evidence of congressional intent to grant federally-funded
counsel to indigent state clemency petitioners).
106
See Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete, 484 U.S. 539, 551 (1988) (explaining that Congress “has the authority to
amend the legislation,” while the courts’ authority “is limited to interpreting it”).
107
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
108
See generally White v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1995).
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B. Federalism Concerns
Although the plain language of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
grants federally-funded counsel to indigent state clemency petitioners,
courts might nevertheless deny such representation because of federalism
concerns. The individual states have traditionally enjoyed nearly
unfettered discretion in establishing their own clemency procedures. The
procedures (and even the very existence) of state clemency proceedings
lie entirely within the jurisdiction of the state, and since they are a matter
of grace rather than right, ordinary constitutional procedural
requirements do not apply,109 including the right to counsel. The
Supreme Court has held that a prisoner’s clemency petition represents a
“unilateral hope” that the state will consider freeing him as a matter of
grace.110 State clemency procedures, then, are discretionary by nature.
They are not the “business of [the] courts.”111 Similarly, state clemency
authority “would cease to be a matter of grace” if federal
constitutional/procedural requirements governed state clemency
proceedings.112 While capital state clemency petitioners retain a “residual
life interest,”113 they are not constitutionally entitled to counsel, or even
an unbiased decision maker.114 Throughout American history, the
existence and procedures of state clemency have been free from judicial
and federal interference. States have traditionally been able to deny
counsel in clemency proceedings, since such proceedings are merely a
matter of grace.115
Wherever possible, courts will not attribute to Congress the intent
to intrude on traditionally state-controlled governmental functions.116
This is the essence of federalism, a principle that “is nothing more than
an acknowledgement that the States retain substantial sovereign powers
under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not
readily interfere.”117 Although the plain language of § 848(q)(8) requires
the federal government to fund indigent state clemency petitioners, states
might be concerned that such an interpretation of the statute would allow
federal encroachment upon a traditional area of state sovereignty. States
have long been able to dictate their own clemency procedures, including
109

See supra note 4.
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 282 (1998).
111
Id. (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 281.
114
See, e.g., Perry v. Brownlee, 122 F.3d 20 (8th Cir. 1997).
115
See White v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991)).
116
See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 546 (2002).
117
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
110
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whether to allow and fund counsel at clemency hearings. The statutory
language of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, however, would take the
issue of clemency counsel away from the states and give it to the federal
government. The plain language of § 848, therefore, presents a direct
conflict between Congress and traditional state sovereignty to dictate
procedure at state clemency proceedings.
Congress, then, is encroaching on state authority when it tells the
states that all indigent capital state clemency petitioners are entitled to
federally-funded counsel regardless of whether the state denies them
such representation. Such a violation of the principles of federalism
might dictate that § 848, regardless of the clarity of the plain language,
not be interpreted as granting federally-funded counsel to all indigent
state capital clemency petitioners. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits should
have followed this line of reasoning to their conclusion rather than
relying on the Lindsey reasoning and asserting the ambiguity of the
statutory language.
IV. BALANCE BETWEEN PLAIN LANGUAGE AND FEDERALISM CONCERNS
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits never questioned the
constitutionality of Congress establishing procedural requirements in
state clemency hearings.118 Such concerns might be sufficient to deny
federally-funded representation to state clemency petitioners. An
accepted canon of statutory interpretation dictates that statutes should be
interpreted, whenever reasonable, to avoid constitutional conflicts such
as federalism concerns.119 The “plain language” of the statute, however,
dictates that indigent state capital clemency petitioners are always
entitled to legal representation appointed either by the state or the federal
government.120 Nevertheless, courts should have federalism concerns
given this federal encroachment on an area that has historically been
granted complete state discretionary authority. Thus, courts are
seemingly faced with a conflict between the plain statutory language and
the need to preserve state sovereignty regarding clemency proceedings.

118
The Lindsey court did hold that adopting a “plain language” interpretation would
produce federalism concerns in so much as it would result in the waiver of the state
exhaustion requirement, but no such exhaustion concern applies to clemency
proceedings, especially after the passage of the AEDPA. See In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d
1502, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1989).
119
See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979) (holding that petitioner had no jurisdiction over lay teachers employed by churchoperated schools because to allow petitioner jurisdiction over such matters presented
significant risks that the First Amendment would be infringed).
120
See supra text accompanying notes 88–107.
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I propose a compromise position that balances the “plain language”
conclusion of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits with the concerns of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The Tenth Circuit adopted a clear plain
language interpretation without regard for constitutional conflicts such as
federalism concerns. The Eighth Circuit was also unwilling to disregard
the plain statutory language, but attempted to limit its application so as to
address the accompanying procedural and constitutional conflicts. The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits adopted the Lindsey conclusion, which, by
straying from the plain statutory language, would result in no federal
funding for counsel representing indigent petitioners seeking state
executive clemency. First, I will explain the inadequacy of the Eight
Circuit’s compromise in Hill v. Lockhart, and second, I will detail my
proposed compromise, which would allow federal funding for indigent
state clemency petitioners under circumstances determined by the
individual states.
A. Inadequacy of the Hill Compromise
The Eighth Circuit attempted a compromise in Hill v. Lockhart, but
it failed to resolve the relevant federalism concerns. The Hill court
proposed that § 848(q) be understood to permit federally-funded counsel
to indigent state clemency petitioners when (1) the request comes as part
of a non-frivolous federal habeas petition, (2) state law does not provide
funding for representation in clemency proceedings, and (3) the attorney
requests compensation for state proceedings before performing the
services.121 Although this solution cautiously satisfies the statutory plain
language, it does not address the federalism concerns presented by
Congress’s attempt to establish its own procedural requirements for state
clemency proceedings.
The Eighth Circuit’s first and third requirements for granting
federally-funded counsel to indigent state clemency petitioners were
directly addressed by the AEDPA. Both requirements are designed to
ensure that state petitioners do not file premature “shell” habeas petitions
in an attempt to secure federal counsel for subsequent proceedings,
including clemency. With the passage of the AEDPA, the threat of
frivolous habeas petitions is less substantial than it was when the court
decided Hill in 1993.122 The Eighth Circuit’s second requirement, that
state law does not already fund clemency counsel for indigent
petitioners, is borrowed from the Lindsey court.123 As noted above, the
121
122
123

Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993).
See supra text accompanying notes 82–85.
See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
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concern that the statute will supplant state mechanisms for providing
clemency counsel is insufficient to ignore the plain statutory language. In
addition, as will be noted below, the language of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act itself adequately addresses this concern.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the plain statutory language
required federally-funded counsel in state clemency proceedings. It also
recognized that freely following the plain language would cause
substantial conflicts between the federal government and the states. As a
result, the Hill court attempted to apply the plain language with some
qualifications. However, those qualifications failed to address the
principal federalism concerns that now confront courts interpreting §
848(q). For example, a petitioner from a state that chooses to deny
representation to indigent clemency petitioners could nevertheless satisfy
the Hill requirements and receive federally-funded counsel at his
clemency hearing. Such a result allows the federal government to violate
the state’s established clemency procedural guidelines.
B. Proposed Solution
The plain statutory language of § 848(q)(8) provides that any
capital habeas petitioner convicted under state law is entitled to
federally-funded counsel at the habeas proceeding and at state clemency
proceedings.124 However, a simple acceptance of this interpretation
would violate principles of federalism. My proposed solution recognizes
that courts can follow the plain statutory language without violating
principles of federalism.
My proposal is centered on the understanding that states have the
authority to determine the threshold question of whether they will permit
counsel to represent capital clemency petitioners. The Supreme Court has
held that the discretionary nature of state executive clemency hearings
keeps them separated from the judicial system and due process standards,
thus allowing states to deny representation in clemency proceedings if
they so desire.125
If a state exercises its option to deny all capital petitioners within its
jurisdiction counsel during clemency proceedings, I propose that an
indigent petitioner not be appointed federally-funded counsel to represent
him in those proceedings. This proposal allows states to determine the
procedures of their own clemency hearings without violating the plain
statutory language of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The statutory
124
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that the counsel provision applies to “any
post conviction proceeding under section 2254”).
125
See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1998).
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language of § 848(q)(8) provides that federally-funded attorneys
appointed during the habeas hearing “shall also represent the defendant
in such . . . proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be
available to the defendant.”126 In a state that denies counsel to all
clemency petitioners, a clemency hearing with counsel is unavailable to
the defendant, and thus falls outside the realm of § 848(q)(8). By denying
counsel to all indigent clemency petitioners, a state has made the ultimate
determination that neither state-funded nor federally-funded counsel is
available to the defendant, and thus § 848(q) is inapplicable.
If a state does not exercise its discretion in denying representation
in clemency proceedings, it then has the option of providing adequate
counsel at the state level for indigent capital defendants. If adequate state
counsel is provided, § 848(q)(4)(B) explicitly denies the appointment of
federally-funded counsel since the petitioner is no longer “unable to
obtain adequate representation” without the statute. In such a situation,
the statutory language recognizes that it is unnecessary to use federal
funds to represent a state clemency petitioner. Because indigent state
clemency petitioners have access to adequate representation through the
state, § 848(q)(8) does not apply.
If a state allows representation in clemency proceedings, but
chooses not to provide adequate representation itself, however, the
statute is applicable and federally-funded counsel shall be provided for
indigent petitioners seeking federal habeas relief followed by state
clemency relief. In § 848(q)(8), Congress required that federal funds be
used to compensate counsel in any clemency proceedings “available to
the defendant.” Because state law has not denied representation to
clemency petitioners, a clemency hearing with the assistance of counsel
is available to them. Under these circumstances, the state has decided to
allow representation during its clemency proceedings, so § 848(q) does
not conflict with state law. If such counsel is not provided at the state
level, the federal government is free to supply the representation in
accordance with § 848(q)’s plain language without violating principles of
federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain language of § 848(q) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
dictates that indigent state capital clemency petitioners are entitled to
federally-funded representation. Two of the four circuits that have
decided cases on point, however, have ignored the plain statutory
language and determined that § 848(q) never provides federally-funded
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counsel to indigent state clemency petitioners. The courts that deny
federally-funded representation to state clemency petitioners base their
conclusion on the reasoning presented in In re Lindsey, but such
reasoning is more applicable to federally-funded counsel at state judicial,
rather than clemency, proceedings. Instead of relying on the reasoning in
Lindsey, the courts could have presented a stronger case for straying
from the plain statutory language if they had reached the same
conclusion because of federalism concerns. My proposed solution
resolves the existing circuit split by balancing the need to adhere to the
plain statutory language with the need to uphold established principles of
federalism.

